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WHY THEY RISE UP, OR NOT: A STUDY OF LINGUISTIC MINORITIES AND 
ETHNIC-NATIONAL MOBILIZATION 
Yelei Kong 
 
Abstrac t :  Most theories of nationalism focus on majority nationalism and do not provide an adequate explanation of 
the inaction of most ethnic minorities. This paper adopts the political process model from social movement theory to 
study the factors that prompt linguistic minorities to mobilization on ethno-national grounds. Using a large-N 
statistical model with data drawn from the Minority at Risk database, the results indicate that the higher capacity, the 
more opportunity for action, and the better the issue is framed, the more likely linguistic minorities would mobilize. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the French revolution in the 18th century, scholars have recognized nationalism 
as a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the origin and development of nationalism remain subjects of 
heated theoretical debate and empirical dispute. Although historians have fairly documented the path 
of the most visible nationalist movements, the inaction of many others has gone unnoticed.  
This paper examines the factors that influence ethno-national mobilization among linguistic 
minorities. Language and religion are among the most salient factors that can trigger a nationalist 
movement. This is not surprising, since nationalism is a movement based on cultural claims. 
Compared to economic wellbeing or political status, linguistic traits and religious choices are essential 
to one’s identity.1 Because of the inherent link between language and ethnicity,2 this research focuses 
on minority groups defined by language. The emphasis is on minority nationalism, a sub-field of 
nationalism studies that can be best understood from cross-disciplinary studies.  
If each linguistic group is considered as a distinctive nation, then there are too few spaces in 
the world today to accommodate each nation with a state.3 According to Gellner’s calculation, there 
are 8,000 different languages on earth and currently 200 states. If we “pretend that we have four 
times that number of reasonably effective nationalism on earth, in other words, 800 of them,” this 
will still “give us only one effective nationalism for ten potential ones!”4 Thus, the question arises: 
why do some resort to a nationalist movement, while others do not. 
To answer this question, a preliminary review of the current theories is required. The 
following discussion combines the mainstream theories on ethnic nationalism with social movement 
theory models to analyze the dynamics of ethno-national mobilization of linguistic minorities.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kymlicka 1996 
2 Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002 
3 Gellner 1983 
4 Gellner 1983, 45 
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LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM 
Theorists tend to view nationalism as either a cultural phenomenon rooted in history or a 
constructed product during the modern era.5 Benedict Anderson is the leading representative of the 
second view and arguably the founder of constructivism. His landmark 1983 work Imagined 
Communities challenged the first belief that national myth was ancient and cultural. He revealed how 
the concept was manufactured by the literate class and refined through the interaction between the 
elite and the people. In fact, the modern nation could only be imagined since the stretched territory 
and sheer size of populations made intragroup intimacy and recognition impossible.  
Another important camp of nationalism studies is the modernists, headed by Ernest Gellner. 
They argue that the process of modernization brought nationalism into existence both in the interest 
of the state and as a political principle. Nationalism is simply not a Sleeping Beauty awaiting the kiss 
of modernism.6 Despite theoretical disagreements, most scholars agree on the essential role language 
plays in ethnic identity formation.7 Whereas Anderson focuses on the uniform use of literary 
language as the foundation for an imagined community, Gellner stresses the congruence between 
political and cultural boundaries in a monolingual state. It is “through that language, encountered at 
mother’s knee and parted with only at the grave [that], pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, 
and futures dreamed.”8 
 It is a consensus among theorists that language defines group boundaries, whether literal or 
imagined; however, they seldom address the issue of minority nationalism. Majority nationalism is 
usually either a revolution against a dominant class (e.g. the French middle class against the 
aristocrats) or a movement against a foreign power (e.g. the post colonialist movement in Africa). In 
both cases, the nationalists have a relative majority base that challenges the ruling class or foreign 
power. However, in the case of minority nationalism, the disadvantaged language group is pitted 
against the majority. Although some linguistic minorities can also argue for the principle of the 
congruence of political and ethnic boundaries, they are inherently in a weaker position to do so. In 
fact, most ethno-national minorities never rise up; they never assert their linguistic identities as a 
foundation for political independence or autonomy within the majority nation-states. The existing 
literature is therefore inadequate to address the question of what drives ethno-national mobilization 
among language minorities. 
Part of the problem lies in the inherent difficulty in studying non-actions. Political scientists, 
like scientists in general, are studying the casual relationships in the world. Where X happened, they 
search for what factors cause X and how they produce X. But, when X does not happen, the absence 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Motyl 2002 
6 Beiner 1999 
7 Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002; Anderson 1983; Jung 1987 
8 Anderson 1983 
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of the X-causing factor may not be sufficient to establish causality. With a large-N statistical study, it 
is possible to approach the question in a different way. Instead of asking what prevents some 
minorities from mobilizing, the focus should be on what factors influence their decision to mobilize 
on nationalist ground, and if they do, how their level of movement is affected by various 
independent factors. In the end, although the question cannot be answered definitively, evidence can 
be shown that the degree and quality of certain factors can make a linguistic minority either more or 
less likely to develop an ethno-national movement.  
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES 
Ethno-national mobilization represents a form of social movement. As social movements 
tend to involve a special sector of the society, their participants are usually only a minority of the 
population. Therefore, social movement theories are particularly suited for the study of minority 
nationalism.  
Behind most social movement theories today is the rational choice theory. It assumes that 
individuals are rational actors who weigh benefits and cost before taking an action.9 People join a 
movement in the hope of gaining something more than they would potentially lose. The 
utilitarianism assumption is simple, yet very influential in the thinking of most social scientists. In a 
field study done in Ghana, Laitin used game theory to illustrate individual choices in language 
selection.10 The local Ghanaian parents could choose to send their children to either a school taught 
in the indigenous language or a school taught in English. Laitin finds that the choices were not 
entirely based on economic gain. Local honor and external acceptance were equally influential as 
economic pay-offs.11  
Besides rational choice theory, there are three other major theories on social movement: 
relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and consciousness construction. The first two stress the 
structural aspects to explain social movement, whereas the last one takes a cultural approach.  
Relative deprivation focuses on “situations producing individual-level stress or discontent as 
a major cause of social movement development.”12 These unsatisfying conditions are usually the 
result of social stratification or injustice. The “frustration-aggression hypothesis” predicts that as 
discontent increases, the possibility of social movement increases as well. Shifting the focus from the 
underlying motivation to the necessary resources for mobilization, social scientists have developed 
resource mobilization theory. This current mainstream theory emphasizes the ability of the starters to 
motivate individuals, gain access to power, mobilize social resources and utilize political and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Hechter 1996 
10 Laitin 1993  
11 Ibid. 
12 Kerbo 1982, 646 
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economic structures to promote certain objectives.13 In essence, resource mobilization theorists 
consider “structure as relatively stable features of a movement’s environment that influence action by 
shaping opportunities,”14 and “attempt to demonstrate empirically that individual behaviors are 
channeled by a series of structural constraints.”15  
 In recent years, scholars have started to rely on the “cultural formations” in social 
movement theory. This “consciousness construction” theory focuses on “how social movements 
generate and are affected by the construction of meaning, consciousness raising, the manipulation of 
symbols, and collective identities.”16 However, not all theorists take a diametrical view between 
structural and cultural approaches. Myra Marx Ferree suggests that “individuals should be regarded as 
members of a community whose interests reflect their structural locations.”17 As scholars have 
explained, it is not just the particular issue that is important, but also how it is framed.18  
The four theories described above provide useful lenses through which to examine social 
movements, but critics have pointed out theoretical flaws and empirical difficulties in applying them.  
As implied by rational choice theory, blocked social mobility would lead to nationalist movement. 
For example, education is a universal channel for upward social mobility, and people with higher 
education can expect more financial rewards than others. Thus, when college graduates find their 
career paths blocked for ethnic reasons, they should be more likely to mobilize. In fact, “this 
emphasis on the cultural elements of nationalism places intellectuals, in effect those most able to 
revive, stimulate and diffuse cultural artifacts, at the forefront of any national movement.”19 
However, data has shown otherwise. Although decreased opportunities among the intellectuals have 
been believed to be the causes of Irish nationalism in the early twentieth century and the Canadian 
nationalism in the 1970s, the data has shown that job markets for them were actually expanding, not 
shrinking.20 
Besides empirical invalidity, rational choice theory also failed to explain extreme acts of 
ethnic violence, like suicide bombers, when the benefits were little and the costs were too high. Thus 
it was viewed as ineffective to explain non-economic activities.21 In order to reconcile this conflict, 
Varshney introduced the distinction between instrumental rationality and value rationality. Whereas 
the former is a “strict cost-benefit analysis,”22 the latter relies on the conscience and perception of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid. 
14 Giugni 1998, 372 
15 Ibid., 367 
16 Giugni 1998 
17 Ibid., 365-375 
18 Giugni 1998; Cormier 2003; Cederman and Girardin 2007 
19 Cormier 2003, 529 
20 Ibid. 
21 Hechter 1996 
22 Varshney 2003, 86  
RES PUBLICA  11 
the good of the people, independent of the prospect of material or immediate gain. By expanding the 
definition of rationality, the rational choice theory was able to explain a broader scope of movement.  
Critics have also found two problems with relative deprivation theory. The first one is its 
inability to identify the specific conditions that cause grievance.23 Another problem is that since 
discontents are behind all movements, relative deprivation theory cannot explain why a lower level of 
frustration may cause mobilization and where a higher one does not.24 Cormier’s study of blocked 
mobility is such an example. Although the deprivation model is intuitively reasonable, empirically it 
has led to few discoveries. 
By using the resource mobilization model, theorists have been able to locate the fundamental 
causes of many social movements. However, they faced serious challenges as well. The first is the 
free-rider problem. When one could benefit from a movement without joining it, one might choose 
not to participate at all.25 Therefore, resource mobilization fails to address how people are dissuaded 
from free-riding. The second problem is essentially the strength of relative deprivation theory. 
Historically, many social movements occurred without significant structural changes in society and 
typically they were the result of mass grievance.26 Thus, a movement could gain momentum before 
resources became available. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and consciousness construction theories all 
view social movement formation from different perspectives: grievance-driven action, resource-
utilization, and issue formation, respectively. By extracting the central element from each of these 
theories, some scholars have proposed a more comprehensive theory: the political process model.27 
Its three components are mobilizing structure, political opportunity structure, and cultural framing. 
Mobilizing structure is an internal resource that includes “informal networks, preexisting institutional 
structures, and formal organization.”28 Political opportunity structure refers to the outside political 
environment that provides incentive for action. And cultural framing refers to the bridge connecting 
the internal and external structure, or “the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their 
situation.”29  
In a sense, the political process theory is a combination of capacity, opportunity, and 
constructed ideas. In the past, nationalist theorists have also addressed similar issues of existing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Kerbo 1982 
24 Cederman and Girardin 2007  
25 Kerbo 1982 
26 Ibid. 
27 Morris 2000 
28 Ibid., 446 
29 Ibid. 
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network, current situation, and issue formation.30 Existing network refers to the strength of minority 
group vis-à-vis the majority, the institutional structure of community, and formal organizations 
within the ethnic group. Current situation is their political status within the state they reside, 
treatment by the majority, and incentives for action. Issue formation explains how the elites 
construct the meaning of their situation, frame collective identities, and manipulate symbols. Table 1 
below summarizes the application of political process model to the study of minority nationalist 
movement. 
 
Table 1: Applying Political Process Model to Minority Nationalist Movement 
Political Process Model 
Mobilizing Structure Opportunity Structure Cultural Framing 
 
 
Minority Nationalist Movement 
Internal  
Capacity 
• Strength of the minority 
group 
• Institutional structure 
• Formal organization 
External  
Opportunity 
• Political status in the state  
• Treatment by majority 
• International environment 
Issue  
Formation 
• Construction of meanings 
• Collective identities 
• Manipulation of symbols 
 
This model allows for a better study of minority nationalist movements because it gives a 
more inclusive analysis of the mobilization process. It incorporates both the internal and the external 
structure, without leaving aside the cultural perspective of nationalism. However, its critics point to 
the limited assumption of the prior occurrence of political opportunity for movement.31 By stressing 
structural necessity, it neglects the importance of agency and how action could create favorable 
conditions for movement. While the criticism is well-grounded, the problem of the alternative is still 
empirical validation. It is easy to recognize how individual initiatives influence the movement, but 
difficult to prove the causal link. Thus, albeit its limitations, the political process model offers the 
best means available to study minority nationalism. According to this model, the following 
hypotheses are proposed:  
H1) The more internal capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they will mobilize on 
ethno-national grounds.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Gellner 1983; Anderson 1983 
31 Morris 2000 
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H2) The more external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they will mobilize on 
ethno-national grounds. 
H3) The better the issue is framed, the more likely the linguistic minorities will mobilize on 
ethno-national grounds. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to test these hypotheses in the broadest possible perspective, this research employs 
a large-N statistical model using the latest data (2006) from the Minority at Risk (MAR) database. 
MAR contains standardized data on the status and conflict of more than 283 ethnic groups with a 
population of at least 500,000. It is the most exhaustive and most commonly cited database on ethnic 
mobilization among scholars. Apart from the fact that it is the most comprehensive database 
available, it is selected for another important reason. The MAR also codes language, custom, religion, 
and other distinctive characteristics of each minority group. This is extremely helpful, because often 
language and religion intertwine and their cleavages overlap each other. In cases where linguistic and 
religious cleavages overlap, it would be difficult to empirically testify which one is the major cause of 
nationalism and by what degree. Luckily, MAR allows one to choose only linguistic minorities for 
more control and thus adds validity to the examination. In the dataset, LANG is the measure for 
different language group and it is coded from 0-2. 0 represents linguistic assimilation with the 
plurality group, 1 that a group speaks multiple languages and at least one different from the plurality 
group, and 2 that a group speaks primarily one language different from the plurality group. Only 
cases with a LANG score of 2 are selected, ruling out all but 48 cases. Bivariate correlation and OLS 
regression models are both used to test the hypotheses.  
While the LANG measurement allows one to distinguish linguistic minorities from other 
minorities, some scholars have criticized its measures as inadequate.32 In MAR, language difference is 
measured by language distance – “the genetic relationship of languages that share a common 
ancestor” – without considering the actual difficulty of learning the language and concrete social 
impact of such difference.33 Mabry argued that “the most important political characteristic of any 
language community in contact with another is the relative social and political status of their two (or 
more) languages.”34 While this paper does not consider the linguistic difference as a cause of ethnic 
conflict, it is worth addressing Mabry’s criticism. Although LANG may not be a measure of actual 
difference, it is a good indication that there is a significant difference. A value of 2 in LANG means 
that the minority language is not intelligible to the majority and vice versa. Therefore, it is safe to 
assume there is a linguistic barrier and to a great extent, a cultural division between the two. Since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Cederman and Girardin 2007; Mabry 2011 
33 Mabry 2011 
34 Ibid., 203 
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language occupies a central position in the formation of ethnicity as it is the essential medium of 
communication and preservation of national culture,35 linguistic difference almost always leads to 
cultural difference. Because of the strong link between language and culture, the selection based on 
LANG produces a set of cases where minorities are actually different from the majority in terms of 
culture. Therefore, other factors36 that might affect the ethnic mobilization of minorities can be 
eliminated and one can focus on how factors in the political process model affect ethnic mobilization 
of linguistic minorities.  
OPERATIONALIZING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The dependent variable for this study is ethnic mobilization. In MAR, there are a few 
measures that are directly related to this: protest (0-5), rebellion (0-7), and separatism index (0-3).  
They are recoded into an index of ethnic mobilization (IEM). IEM = (Protest / 5) * 20% + 
(Rebellion /7) * 35% + (Separatism / 3) * 45%. Since IEM is a continuum, from non-violent protest 
at one end and separation at the other, each measure is assigned different weight. First, each measure 
is divided by its scale in order to make them comparable to each other. Then, separatism is weighted 
the heaviest here because it is the most extreme form of political nationalism. Protest is weighted the 
least due to its non-violent nature. In the end, rebellion is weighted higher than protest due to its use 
of violence and lower than separatism since the measure does not necessarily specify the ultimate 
level of political demand for the rebels. In total, IEM ranges from 0 to 1.  
OPERATIONALIZING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The three independent variables are internal capacity, external opportunity, and issue 
formation. To operationalize them, five proxy measures are chosen from MAR, group spatial 
distribution (GROUPCON) for capacity, political autonomy (AUTLOST) for opportunity and 
political (POLGR), economic (ECGR) and cultural (CULGR) grievance for issue formation. 
Group Spatial Distribution as a Proxy for Capacity 
According to political process theory, capacity includes networks, institutions and 
organizations within an ethnic community. While their strength is difficult to measure and compare 
across communities, the spatial distribution of population might be a good indication of their 
efficacy. The concentration of the population matters because only with a large share and 
concentrated population can a minority be able to construct a self-sustainable political system – 
“sufficiently large and institutionally complete.”37 Generally, the more concentrated a minority is, the 
stronger ties they would have, since it is easier to communicate and establish relationships. Although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Argenter 2002 
36 For example, in the MAR database, BELIEF measures the religious differences between the minority gourp 
and the majority. Among the cases selected here, Pearson’s correlation result show no significant correlation 
(.696 level) between BELIEF and the EMI, the measure for dependent variable here.  
37 Kymlicka 2003, 40 
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technology has made long-distance connection relatively easy and affordable, when it comes to 
action, a concentrated group is inherently better suited than a dispersed one. Since the question 
which concerns us is the relationship between capacity and mobilization, not capacity itself per se, 
spatial distribution is a good proxy measure for group capacity. In MAR, group spatial distribution is 
coded under GOUPCON from 0 to 3, 0 for widely dispersed, 1 for primarily urban or minority in 
one region, 2 for majority in one region, others dispersed, and 3 for concentrated in one region. 
Political Autonomy as a Proxy for Opportunity 
Opportunity refers to the external “political environment that provides incentives for people 
to undertake collective action.”38 In MAR, one measure is the index of lost political autonomy based 
on year of autonomy loss, magnitude of change and group status prior to loss of autonomy. The 
score ranges from 0 to 6, and the higher the score, the greater autonomy the minority has enjoyed in 
the past and the more recent such power has been taken away from them. Scholars have found that 
path dependence is a strong factor in ethnic conflict.39 If a minority has been involved in an ethnic 
conflict, it is more likely to have more ethnic violence in the future than those who did not have such 
experience. Similarly, if a minority had enjoyed relative autonomy in the past, they would be more 
inclined to rise up than those who had never had such privileges. Also, because of their previous 
independence or autonomy, the external environment or the majorities would be more sympathetic 
and acceptive to their demand. Therefore, the index of lost political autonomy can be a good 
measure for external political opportunity. 
Grievance as a Proxy for Issue Formation  
Among the three variables, issue formation is the most troublesome to measure. The efficacy 
of issue formation not only depends on how the issue is interpreted by the leader, but also how it is 
accepted by the masses. Both are subjective standards. In MAR, political, economic and cultural 
grievances are measured by the highest level articulated by group leaders or observed by third parties. 
In fact, the codebook explicitly states that if the majority of the people demonstrate lower levels of 
grievance and radicals expressed higher levels, the higher score will be coded for this ethnic group. 
Although this measure is not an exact estimation of grievances, this touches on some elements of 
issue framing. One important aspect of issue framing is that how it is framed is more important than 
the actual grievance. Naturally, the leader has an incentive to exaggerate the issue in order to incite 
popular sentiment. In this perspective, the higher grievance coded by MAR, the more likely the 
populace will take action. Even though it does not address all features of issue formation, the 
grievance measure indicates one way issue formation could affect ethnic mobilization. In this paper, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Morris 2000, 446 
39 Cederman and Girardin 2007 
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the political, economic and cultural grievances are recoded into an index of grievance which is an 
aggregate score of the three, ranging from 0 to 8.  
ANALYSIS 
The Significance of EMI Index 
In the Minority at Risk database, 282 ethnic groups are recorded. Only minorities with a 
LANG score of two40 are selected for this study, yielding 48 cases across 36 countries.41 Table 2 
summarizes the distribution of dependent variable measures.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of Dependent Variables 
 Protest (0-5) Separatism (0-3) Rebellion (0-7) EMI Index (0-1) 
Average  0.92 1.69 0.51 0.32 
Standard 
Deviation 1.22 1.34 1.57 0.25 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 4 3 7 0.84 
Mode (number) 0 (26) 3 (23) 0 (41) 0.15 (8) 
N=48 for Protest and Separatism, N=47 for Rebellion and EMI Index 
 
It is apparent from the table that separatism is the most significant among the three 
measures from MAR with an average score of 1.69.  Nearly half of the cases have the highest score 
of 3. On the other side, average scores for protest and rebellion are relatively low, 0.92 and 0.51 
respectively. Also, their modes are both 0, indicating that inactivity is common. Based on these three, 
the EMI index has a score range from 0 to 0.84 and an average score of 0.32. As EMI index reflects 
the continuum of the nationalist movement, its strength can be shown as its correlation with the rest 
of the measures and this relationship is graphically represented in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In the MAR codebook, LANG score means that “group speaks primarily one language, different from 
plurality group: Plurality of group speaks the same language AND it is different from plurality group language 
(e.g., Kurds in Turkey or Iraq).”  
41 Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burma, Croatia, Cyprus, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, 
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Guinea, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Laos, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Yugoslavia (Serbia), Zimbabwe. 
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Figure 1: Relationship between Protest, Separatism, Rebellion, EMI index 
 
N=47 
The increase of EMI accompanies the increasing scores of separatism and rebellion. In cases 
where only protest score is high, EMI is relatively low, reflecting the non-violent and less intensive 
nationalist movement. Whereas all three measures are high towards the end of the cases, EMI 
increases significantly as well, representing the violent and intensive mobilization of minorities. 
Therefore, EMI index is a reliable measure of ethno-nationalist mobilization as its distribution 
follows the theoretical assumption.  
Correlation Check on Independent variables 
Before examining the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables, it 
worth making sure that there is no internal correlation between the independent variables. Table 3 
below shows the correlations between the three, and none of them have any significant relationship 
with each other. 
 
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlations for independent variables 
  
Group Spatial 
Distribution 
Political 
Autonomy Total Grievance 
Group Spatial 
Distribution 
Pearson Correlation 1 .096 .215 
Sig. (1-tailed)   .257 .071 
Political 
Autonomy 
Pearson Correlation .096 1 .158 
Sig. (1-tailed) .257   .142 
Total 
Grievance 
Pearson Correlation .215 .158 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .071 .142   
N=48 
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Testing Hypotheses 
 In order to test the bivariate relationships between each independent variable with ethno-
national mobilization, Table 4 reposts the results of Pearson’s bivariate correlations.  
 
Table 4: Pearson’s Correlations for Ethno-national Mobilization Index (EMI) 
  Ethno-nationalist Mobilization Index 
H1. Group spatial distribution Pearson Correlation .386** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .004 
H2. Political Autonomy Pearson Correlation .274* 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .031 
H3. Total Grievance Pearson Correlation .758** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
N=47 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).      
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).      
 
According to the hypothesis, the higher capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they 
would mobilize on ethno-national ground. With group spatial distribution as a proxy measure for 
higher capacity, Table 3 validates the existence of such correlation. Nearly 40% of data confirmed 
this relationship.  
For the second hypothesis, that the more external opportunity the minority has, the more 
likely they would mobilize on ethno-national grounds, the correlation is weaker.  Its value is only .274 
and is significant at the .031 level. Part of the reason for this weak relationship probably lies in the 
skewed value distribution of political autonomy since two-thirds of the cases have a relatively low 
score, either 0 or 1 on a scale of 0 to 5. With so many cases on the lower end, the relatively 
insignificant result is understandable. The strongest evidence is for the third hypothesis: the better 
the issue is framed, the more likely linguistic minorities will mobilize. The proxy measure, total 
grievance, has a .758 correlation value with the EMI index and is significant at the .000 level. 
Although such a high value is surprising, the strong relationship is anticipated. After all, ethno-
national mobilization is a political movement and political grievance is particularly influential among 
the minorities examined here. Therefore, the initial correlations confirm all three hypotheses. 
 
Table 5: OLS Regression for Ethno-national Mobilization Index (EMI) 
  Standardized Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients Beta Significance 
Group Spatial 
Distribution .022 .197 .043 
Political Autonomy .018 .159 .093 
Total Grievance .011 .688 .000 
N=47 
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From Table 5, it is obvious that total grievance is still the most influential. Explaining nearly 
70% of the variance in EMI, it remains significant at the .000 level. Group spatial distribution comes 
second, with a beta score of .197 and significance at the .05 level. Political autonomy is the least 
significant, explaining only 15.9% of the cases and is significant only at the .1 level. However, 
political autonomy nearly became irrelevant when group spatial distribution and total grievance are 
held constant. As demonstrated above, the majority of the variance in ethno-national mobilization 
can be accounted for by the framing of grievances. The more political grievances are articulated 
within a linguistic minority, the more likely they will move along the mobilization scale towards 
manifested nationalist movement and even violence. 
Clearly, the third hypothesis is supported most strongly by the data. This finding also ties 
back to and confirms the strength of classic relative deprivation theory which emphasizes grievances 
experienced by the minority as the single most important motivation for mobilization. Thus, the 
intuitive assumption of the relationship is verified here. But this proxy measure only covers a small 
portion of issue framing. Future studies should address the empirical difficulty of measuring idea 
construction to validate the hypothesis more comprehensively. Group spatial distribution is also 
significant in the result, and this indicates that concentrated minority groups do have a higher 
tendency to mobilize, again reflecting the importance of capacity. Further, capacity probably directly 
links to issue framing: the higher the capacity, the better the minority will be able to frame their 
grievances. Comparatively, political autonomy is the least influential factor here, although skewed 
data accounts for some of its result as two-thirds of the cases scored either a 0 or 1 on the political 
autonomy scale. Most importantly, past political autonomy only captures one part of the opportunity 
structure. Other aspects, such as international relief or sudden political change, are not incorporated 
in this measure. 
CONCLUSION 
By using a statistical model with data drawn from the Minority at Risk database, the overall 
results of this study support the political process theory, which states that capacity, opportunity, and 
constructed ideas together influence the ethnic mobilization of minorities. The positive relationship 
between spatial distribution and nationalist movement is not surprising. After all, the most visible 
separatist movements in the world today are found among regionally concentrated minorities, such as 
the Canadian Quebecois, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Kurdish people in Iraq. Political opportunity is 
a weaker factor because of the inherent limitation of the proxy measure used here. Empirically, there 
are many examples showing that the lifting of political pressure does lead to an upsurge of nationalist 
movement. On the eve of the Soviet dissolution, many republics began to manifest their nationalist 
claims as soon as Gorbachev gave them the option of political autonomy. However, the difficulties 
lie in how to measure outside political opportunities. Similar problems also challenge the most 
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significant findings here: the more exaggerated the grievance, the more likely linguistic minorities are 
to mobilize. Hence the next step would be how to measure issue formation and compare one 
manipulation to another. Also, a closer examination of how the three factors influence the process of 
mobilization should be carried out in a structured, focused case comparison. Therefore, both a study 
of refined measurement and a detailed examination of a few of the cases selected here will be the 
primary goals of future study.  
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